\begin{table}[H] \centering
\newcolumntype{R}{>{\raggedleft\arraybackslash}X}
\newcolumntype{L}{>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}X}
\newcolumntype{C}{>{\centering\arraybackslash}X}

\caption{Heterogeneity by regime type, OECD membership, and incumbent tenure}
\label{tab:baseline_het_democ_oecd_distance_elapsed_lasttreat}
\begin{tabularx}{\linewidth}{@{}lCCCCCCCC@{}}

\toprule
 & \multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Regime type}} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{OECD}} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Time since last treat.}} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{\textbf{Last elec. treated}} \tabularnewline & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5) & (6) & (7) & (8) \tabularnewline 
{}&{Democ.}&{Autoc.}&{Yes}&{No}&{High}&{Low}&{No}&{Yes} \tabularnewline
\midrule \addlinespace[\belowrulesep]
\textbf{Economic performance}&0.253***&0.300&0.223*&0.301**&0.231**&0.286**&0.261**&0.261* \tabularnewline
&(0.107)&(0.218)&(0.123)&(0.143)&(0.117)&(0.148)&(0.125)&(0.152) \tabularnewline
\textbf{HDI}&0.118&0.494&0.463*&0.055&0.147&0.306&0.086&0.305 \tabularnewline
&(0.167)&(0.639)&(0.283)&(0.214)&(0.252)&(0.223)&(0.224)&(0.237) \tabularnewline
\textbf{Democracy}&0.130&0.846**&0.060&0.328**&0.235&0.209&0.183&0.226 \tabularnewline
&(0.106)&(0.360)&(0.141)&(0.156)&(0.161)&(0.179)&(0.127)&(0.171) \tabularnewline
\textbf{General index}&0.207**&0.551***&0.193&0.321**&0.249**&0.339**&0.250**&0.335** \tabularnewline
&(0.107)&(0.234)&(0.123)&(0.150)&(0.117)&(0.157)&(0.118)&(0.168) \tabularnewline
\bottomrule \addlinespace[\belowrulesep]

\end{tabularx}
\\ \parbox{\linewidth}{\footnotesize \caption*{ \footnotesize \emph{Notes}: This table reports estimated effects of electoral turnovers for different subsamples. Each estimate corresponds to a separate regression. Democracies are regimes labeled as electoral democracies or liberal democracies by V-Dem. Autocracies are regimes labeled as electoral autocracies and closed autocracies by V-Dem. For OECD membership, we consider as members the 30 countries that were members of the OECD at the beginning of 2010. Time since last treat. corresponds to the number of years elapsed since last treatment. We split the sample between elections with a time since last treatment above vs. below the median, computed among elections for which the running variable is under 15 percentage points in absolute value. Last elec. treated corresponds to whether the previous election of the same type was treated or not. Using the method of \cite{clogg1995statistical}, we cannot reject the equality of the estimates for the general index for democracies and autocracies (p-val. =  0.181), OECD and non-OECD countries (p-val. =  0.509), high/low time elapsed since last treatment (p-val. =  0.646), and for previous values of the treatment (p-val. =  0.679). We obtain broadly consistent results when running a parametric regression in which we include the interaction between the treatment and the dimension of heterogeneity. $^{*} p<0.10,^{**} p<0.05,^{***} p<0.01$.}}
\end{table}
